ABSTRACT With the rapid development of the Android platform, numerous applications (apps) are developed to provide new or enhanced services using resources on mobile devices. On one hand, these apps can bring convenience for users in context which has little privacy risk. On the other hand, misuse of these resources by apps may result in privacy leakage in context which has strict requirements for privacy. Therefore, fine-grained resource usage constraint mechanisms that take the context information into account are in demand. In this paper, we present an enhanced context-aware resource usage control system (EasyPrivacy) in Android to provide adaptive resource usage control automatically when the specific context is detected according to the pre-configured policies. In addition, to facilitate users that have little domain knowledge in Android to configure policies reasonably, we have developed an application named TipsTool, which can guide users to configure policies step by step. The Experimental results show that users can easily protect their privacy on smartphones through this system.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, smartphones have gradually become more powerful and more popular computing platforms. As the dominant mobile OS in the smartphone market with a share of 85% [1] , there are numerous applications (apps) developed to provide new or enhanced services using resources on the Android platform. Using privileges that are granted at the time of installation, apps can access sensitive data and resources on mobile devices. Whether an application should get a privilege depends on the specific user context. For instance, assuming a music application with internet accessing and record permissions, allows users to sing songs and share their songs with their friends online through uploading songs, and people will get lots of amusement when at home or some public areas which have little privacy risk. However, it may cause privacy and security breaches when in a private business conversation as this application can easily record the conversation and expose it through the internet without the user's consent [2] . Therefore, it is in demand for users to have a fine-grained resource usage control that take the context information into account, which is not supported by inherent resource usage control mechanism of Android [3] . Privileges that applications can access are determined at the time of installation, and cannot be modified thereafter. In Android6.0, users can dynamically revoke or grant permissions listed in AndroidManifest.xml file of the application, but configuring adaptive access policies according to context is still not supported in the Android platform.
Previous work such as CAreDroid [4] has been done on context-aware computing for the Android OS, which mainly focuses on designing context-aware adaptation engine for developers to facilitate their development. Moreover, most work on context-aware usage control for Android has focused on designing policy systems that do not restrict privileges per application and are only effective system-wide [5] . In addition, others aim at enabling users to configure access policies to applications according to context [6] , [7] . However, there are some limitations in these approaches, such as leaving policy conflict out of consideration when multiple policies are available in a certain context. In addition, the aforementioned work needs users to configure access policies, which ignores a premise that users traditionally have little domain knowledge in Android security and know little about which application will take what potential hazard in a specific context. It is difficult for users to identify suspicious or potentially malicious apps and configure policies reasonably without any specialist help.
To address issues identified above, we present an enhanced context-aware resource usage control system (EasyPrivacy) based on our preliminary version of this study [8] , which provides users the ability to control the resource usages on their smartphones according to specific context information. In order to get an effective and comprehensive control of various resources, we extend the conventional resources (permission, data, system call, and peripheral state), and we also expand the protected resources to include battery energy and app installation. Meanwhile, policy conflict is first considered and preliminarily solved. In addition, we develop an application named TipsTool to facilitate configuration of policies, users can easily identify which apps have the potential probability to expose privacy in a specific context such as holding a highly confidential meeting at the office. In order to achieve a high accuracy in potentially malicious apps identification, we utilize both conventional static features and n-gram opcodes (n-opcodes) of apps to detect suspicious apps installed on smartphones using machine learning methods and the ensemble of them. The main contributions are as follows:
(1) A Context-aware Resource Usage Control System: We present EasyPrivacy, a context-aware adaptive resource usage control system integrated with the Android OS, to enable users to configure resource usage policies according to specific context information. Besides conventional resources, such as permission, data, system call and peripheral state, we extend the protected resources including power energy and app installation to complement the existing researches. (2) Policy Conflict Consideration : We first consider and analyze the policy conflict problem, which is ignored by previous work. In addition, we provide four algorithms to address policy conflict problem when multiple policies are available in a certain context. (3) Facilitating users to configure policies: The difficulty of setting up the configuration policies is that it requires the expertise to identify potentially malicious applications in a specific context. To address it, we first design and implement TipsTool, a lightweight assistance application running on Android, to facilitate users to configure policies more reasonably. It can scan applications installed on smartphones and provide a list of potentially malicious apps when users are configuring policies. In this way, it is easy for users to figure out what applications should be restricted in resource usages. In addition, to get a high accuracy in detecting suspicious apps, we improve TipsTool presented in our previous study [8] through leveraging some machine learning methods and training models under a large scale of datasets (182,341 benign applications and 21,309 malware).
The remaining parts of this paper are organized as follows. We briefly refer to some related studies in Section II. The architecture of EasyPrivacy and TipsTool are described in Section III followed by all the implementation work and technical details in Section IV. Section V reports results of experiments. We analyze the functionality of our approach in Section VI. Finally, we conclude the paper and the future work in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
We structure the related work from three aspects: (i) contextaware computing on the Android platform, (ii) traditional techniques for detecting malware, and (iii) fundamentals of the Android customization.
Previous approaches have been proposed for context-aware computing on the Android OS. CAreDroid [4] is a framework that is designed to decouple the application logic from the complex adaptation decisions in Android context-aware applications. CAreDroid monitored the context information and intercepted calls to sensitive methods, in order to activate only the blocks of code that best fit the current context. However, CAreDroid utilized context information from developer's point of view and only can be used to ease the development of context-aware applications. Kim et al. [51] , GRBAC [9] and CA-ARBAC [51] are approaches that extend traditional role based access control (RBAC) [10] - [12] by incorporating subject roles, such as environment roles for capturing context information (time, system load, etc.). GEO-RBAC [13] is another approach that extended with spatial-based information to deal with different granularities and spatial information. However, these models do not specify on how to implement and deploy these frameworks in real environment. With the purpose of developing these models to real implementation, Kushwaha et al. [5] presented a policy system that does not restrict privileges per application and is only effective system-wide. Kirkpatrick and Bertino [14] , Ozdenizci et al. [15] , and Park and Sandhu [16] defined a policy enforcement mechanism that using Near-Field Communication (NFC) technology and UCON_ABC usage control model to capture user's location and policy restrictions completely . Shebaro et al. [17] proposed a context-based access control (CBAC) mechanism for Android systems. Users can easily configure access policies over their apps' usage of device resources in different contexts. In order to achieve an accurate indoor location, Wi-Fi access points RSSI values are adopted in CBAC. Conti et al. [42] presented CRePE, the first context-aware adaptive system to enforce fine-grained policies on Android system. Jung et al. [44] proposed a context-aware framework for the evaluation of context information with the use of the context evaluation engine. Denis et al. [43] developed a data-driven usage control infrastructure, enabling integration of smart mobile devices into business environments to promote the secure application of mobile business apps. All the work mentioned above ignores a fact that it is difficult for users to configure policies without VOLUME 6, 2018 any domain-knowledge, and the policy conflict is another significant problem that is not discussed in previous work.
Since our work (TipsTool) facilitates users to identify the suspicious apps when configuring policies, our work also relates to Android malware detection techniques.
Some researchers have focused their attention on detecting applications that are over-privileged or malicious to protect user privacy and device resources usage [18] , [19] . AndroidLeaks [20] , [20] is a static analysis framework for automatically finding potential leaks of sensitive information in Android applications. Zhou et al. [21] first proposed a permission-based behavioral footprinting scheme to identify malicious applications. Other studies mainly focused on detecting malware utilizing signature features [22] . These methods based on static features of applications that may be bypassed by novel malware. To overcome this issue, some approaches have focused on monitoring behaviors of applications on real-time to identify malicious events. Andromaly [23] realized a Host-based malware detection system which can monitor various features and events obtained from the smartphones. Crowdroid [24] present a dynamic analysis framework for collection traces from an unlimited number of real users based on crowdsourcing. As these traditional detecting technologies can be rendered largely ineffective due to the new forms of attacking with the use of sophisticated detection avoidance techniques, machine learning based approaches are widely used in this area. Researchers can easily classify malware from benign applications automatically under a large scale of samples [25] - [28] . We also employ machine learning methods to detect malicious applications installed on smartphones. In contrast to the work proposed by Arp et al. [40] , which used conventional static features and achieved the malware detection accuracy as 94%, we adopt n-gram of opcodes to achieve a higher detecting accuracy (98.4%) to facilitate users to configure policies reasonably.
Since our work needs to be developed and integrated with the Android OS, our work also relates to Android OS customizing techniques.
The Android operating system is a stack of software components which is roughly divided into four main layers: Linux kernel, Libraries and Android runtime, Application framework, and Application [29] . The application framework layer provides many high-level services that often used by application developers. With APIs provided by this layer, apps can easily communicate with system services through a binder mechanism to access the underlying hardware. Apps can request to access resources (permissions, data, system peripheral, etc.) through system services registered during booting smartphones. Through modifying its various components in framework layer, developers can customize their own version of Android, and port the customized Android to target smartphones [30] .
There are few approaches that closely relate to our research, such as IdentiDroid [31] , AppFence [32] and ConU-CON [41] , and these work aims to limit privacy leakage and restrict the resource usage through modifying framework layer of the Android OS. Our work extends the protected resources to power energy and app installation, considers and resolves policy conflict. Furthermore, we design and implement an application to help users to configure their policies according to the result of malware detection.
III. SYSTEM DESIGN
In this section, we introduce the architecture of our system and explain the components of our resource usage control framework. In order to make it clear that how our system achieves resource usage control, then we describe the definitions of policy, restriction, and context. We also explain the categories of our policies, and last, we describe the assistance application named TipsTool in detail.
A. ARCHITECTURE OF EASYPRIVACY
The context-aware resource usage control system works in the framework layer of Android OS. To give a clear description, architecture of EasyPrivay is shown in Fig. 1 .
As shown on the right side in Fig. 1 , a resource usage control mechanism exists in Android. It denies or grants the resource access requests of applications simply according to the permission system [33] , which leaves context information aside. To complement the permission-based access mechanism, we introduce context information to EasyPrivacy. We design seven core components to achieve fine-grained context-aware resource usage control. The main components are shown on the left side in Fig. 1 .
Access Controller controls the access to resources of smartphones and prevents unauthorized requests. Although the Android OS provides a permission-based resource usage control mechanism, which can check if apps have privileges to access relevant resources, the Access Controller complement this system with more fine-grained control capabilities and the ability of context-aware. The Access Controller enhances the protection of privacy and security for smartphones. For instance, assuming an application that has internet accessing and record permissions, which provides some amusement functions to users when at home, but may record the conversation of a highly confidential meeting at the office and upload it through internet secretly. If a reasonable policy (forbidden internet and record access request of any applications when in a private conversation) can be configured beforehand by users, our Access Controller can easily prevent the potential risk. Once an application needs to acquire resources, Access Controller will activate Policy Executor to determine whether to grant or deny this request.
Policy Executor takes charge of executing policy returned by Policy Resolver, it will enforce the corresponding policy pre-configured in current context when an application request resources of smartphones, then return the result to Access Controller to deny or grant the access request. If multiple policies are alternatives in a certain context, Policy-Conflict Arbitrator is responsible for solving it based on our Policy-Combining-Rules. Policy-Combining-Rule defines a procedure for determining which policy should be enforced from a set of policies. We used four types of combining algorithms in EasyGuard system, which will be introduced in Section IV.
Policy Resolver aims at parsing policies obtained from Policy Engine and then compares current context information obtained through Context Engine with context pre-stored in policies. Last Policy Resolver returns available policies to Policy Executor if there is at least one policy being configured in the current context.
Policy Engine focuses on managing policies with Policy Repository. Policy Engine provides interfaces for users to create application policies which mainly refer to assigning restrictions to contexts, and stores them into Policy Repository.
Context Engine collects and provides context information (e.g. location and time) through sensors in smartphones, and then assigns a logic name to each context in order to reuse the context information. The location service should keep working in a certain interval to get a more precise and less delay enforcement of policy.
Fined-Granted Resource Processor mainly focuses on processing different sorts of resource access requests. It calls different system services to obtain resources on smartphones according to specifically authorized application requests. Taking location service and power energy as an example, an application requests to acquire the location of devices, Fined-Granted Resource Processor can invoke LocationManager of Android to capture current location information. In the same way, it invokes PowerManager of Android to acquire the wake lock and force the device to stay on [45] .
TipsTool is an application facilitating users that have little domain knowledge to configure their policies reasonably.
TipsTool can guide users to manage (add, update, and delete) polices step by step. It also scans applications installed on smartphones and finds the potentially malicious apps, which makes it easy for users to figure out what applications should be restricted in a specific context. We will describe TipsTool in detail in subsection E.
The workflow of our context-aware resource usage control system can be introduced briefly: Users configure their policies through TipsTool ahead of time if they need to protect their privacy and device security, and our usage control system will intercept applications' resource usage requests and check if there are policies available in current context. Then the available policy will be enforced, and the resource accessing requests will be denied or granted according to the result of policy enforcement.
In order to securely enforce policies configured by users with minimal execution time and processing steps, we carefully design our context-aware resource usage control framework. We also design an application to help users with little domain knowledge in security and privacy to configure their policies. As lots of r have been done in getting the accurate and precise location information, we mainly concentrate our work on policy model, policy conflict, and the assistant application TipsTool.
B. POLICY MODEL
In this section, we describe our policy constructs that compose our context-aware resource usage policies.
Policies consist of restrictions applied to applications of smartphones in specific contexts. Policy restrictions represent the constraint on privileges of applications when accessing protected resources and services. Policy contexts represent when and where the restrictions should be enforced. In order VOLUME 6, 2018 to get a structured description and formatted representation, we introduce several definitions.
First of all, we assume three sets: (1) S, the set of subjects representing the device applications. (2) O, the set of protected objects representing resources (permission, data, power energy, peripheral state, and app installation) on devices. (3) A, the set of constraint actions that can be enforced to control the resource usage.
As the PackageName and UID of each application must be unique in Android according to the permission-based protection mechanism, we can use them to represent each specific application. The set S is composed of the PackageName and UID of applications installed on Android smartphones, and ' * ' represents all installed applications. As shown in Table 1 , for each resource object from the set O, there is an associated action from the set A that used to protect these target objects in specific contexts. 
Definition 1 (Restriction): Let s ∈ S, o ∈ O and a ∈ A.
A policy restriction is defined as the tuple (s, o, a).
Below is an example of a restriction that denying internet accessing request of any applications to prevent the private conversation from being leaked: Restriction = ( * , android.perissiom.INTERNET, deny) Resource usage control policies are linked to a context that specifies when and where the restrictions applied to applications should be enforced. In our model, the policy context is composed of location and time information. A location indicates where a policy should be enforced, and we utilize GPS coordinates and Wi-Fi parameters (MAC address of Wireless AP and Received Signal Strength Indications) to represent a physical location [34] . The time information represents a specific time period that the policy should be enforced, and it consists of a starting time point and ending time point as a lifetime of policies in our model.
In what follows, we assume two sets: (1) LOC, the set of location data representing particular places. (2) TIME, the set of time data representing certain time points. The set LOC is composed of GPS coordinate (longitude and latitude) and Wi-Fi parameters (WIFI), where WIFI is defined as a tuple of MAC address of Wireless AP (MAC_address) and Received Signal Strength Indication (RSSI). A time point from the set of TIME is expressed as: We classify the policies into two categories according to the type of protected resources.
1) ENERGY-BASED POLICIES
This category relates to policies that restrict applications from wasting power energy. For example, in order to save power energy when users do not use their phones for a while, the CPU of smartphones can be suspended by Android. In case that users need to execute some important background tasks, Android provides a WakeLock mechanism that can be used to hold a CPU lock to prevent it from sleeping. However, many apps exploit this vulnerability to enforce their background tasks (uploading personal information, fetching advertisements) when users fall asleep, wasting significant battery energy [45] , [46] . We design the energy-based policies allowing users to set restrictions to save power energy when they do not need to use their smartphones indeed.
2) PRIVACY-BASED POLICIES
This category is related to policies that restrict applications from accessing resources that may cause privacy leakage. We further classify privacy-based policies according to the type of the Object in restrictions as shown below.
• Permission-based policies: This category corresponds to the Android Permissions, mainly restricting applications from accessing certain resources such as Internet, GPS, Camera, etc. In a government or military apartment, in which confidentiality is especially concerned, such as the national lab [51] , the employees are restricted to bring any camera-enabled devices to the workplace, including smartphones, even though the significant data stored in them might be required at any time. With the permission-based policies, employees may be allowed to use their smartphones as they can disable all corresponding functions automatically.
• Data-based policies: This category relates to private data stored on smartphones such as Photos, Calendar and Contact. Assuming that a user loses her/his smartphone and it is picked up by a stranger. Then the stranger takes it to a strange context and tries to browse the data for a malicious purpose (or just out of curiosity). If the owner has ever enforced context constraints on these sensitive data, an authentication will be required when the unfamiliar context is detected, which would prevent the data leakage.
• • App-installation-based policies: This category relates to policies that restrict applications from being installed. Some potentially malicious applications can download and install malware secretly on the background when their corresponding permission requests are granted (such as Internet and INSTALL_PACKAGES permissions), users should have the ability to control the application installation on their smartphones.
D. POLICY CONFLICT
It is obvious that there may is policy conflict when multiple policies alternatives in a certain context and these policies have different actions, such as some mutually exclusive or inclusive policies. For instance, users may configure policies to grant the internet accessing request of applications as they regard their home as a resting place and need to have some amusements. However, users also configure policies to prevent internet accessing request from applications in their smartphones when they hold their private meeting at their home. To address it, we propose four types of Policy-Combining-Rule to solve the conflict of policies preliminarily.
E. POLICY CONFLICTWORKING MECHANISM OF TIPSTOOL
As users have little domain knowledge in Android security and know little about which application will take what potential hazard in a specific context, it is difficult for them to configure policies reasonably without any specialist assistance. To address this problem, we develop an application named TipsTool to facilitate the configuration of policies. For instance, if users need to configure policies to protect their private conversation from being leaked by potentially malicious apps when they are holding a highly confidential meeting at an office, they should configure policies to deny (action of policy restriction) the usage of the recording permission (object of policy restriction) requested by suspicious apps (subject of policy restriction). TipsTool can help them capture the context information through the Context Manager to indicate when and where the policies should be enforced. Meanwhile, users can also create their policy restrictions with the assistance of Restriction Manager to specify what type of action should be enforced to the protected resource. The detailed workflow of TipsTool is depicted in Fig. 2 . As the difficulty of setting up the policy restriction is that it requires the expertise to identify potentially malicious applications, we first design and implement the potential Malware Detection Engine (MDE) in TipsTool to facilitate users to configure policies more reasonably. To get a high accuracy in detecting suspicious apps, we improve TipsTool presented in our previous study [8] through employing some machine learning methods and training models under a large scale of datasets, which will be described in detail in Section IV.
It can scan applications installed on smartphones and detect whether they are potentially malicious with the associated probabilistic scores. 1 (the probabilities of being detected as malware) or not. Meanwhile, it also provides the list of suspicious apps in a specific context and warns users to uninstall apps that have higher probabilities. We set the threshold value of probabilistic score as 0.9 and provide an interface to enable users to configure it.
TipsTool can guide users to configure policies step by step, it also scans applications installed on smartphones and finds the suspicious apps to users. In this way, it is easy for users to figure out which apps should be restricted in resource usages.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we present the technical details of our implementation, including the modifications of the Android OS to achieve the energy-based and privacy-based resource usage control through our system, preliminary solutions of policy conflict and the assistant application TipsTool.
A. IMPLEMENTATION OF EASYPRIVACY
The core of our context-aware resource usage control system is policy, which consists of context and restriction. As lots of work has been done in getting the accurate and precise location information, we mainly concentrate our work on the implementation of modifications on the Android OS (Android Nougat) to restrict resources (permissions, data, peripheral state, app installation, and power energy).
1) PERMISSION MANAGEMENT
All applications in Android are required to explicit send accessing requests when they want to access resources on smartphones, and all the requests will be processed by ActivityManagerService by invoking its' method named checkComponentPermission.
Under this premise mentioned above, we apply our modification to the checkComponentPermission method by simply intercepting the accessing request before the standard permission verification process in Android. In this way, we can deny this kind of requests if the user has configured a policy to prevent that permission from the requesting application in current context, or letting the normal verification process take its course if the user has not configured such policies.
2) RESTRICTIONS ON DATA
Normally, the data on smartphones is stored in relational database systems on Android. In order to make it easy to share data between multiple applications, Android provides a component named ContentProvider, applications can easily access these shared data by utilizing the single ContentResolver interface provided by Android. Taking Contacts as an example, the data of Contacts is stored in a content provider as it is used by multiple applications, and applications can access these data via a ContentResolver instance with a specific URI. Meanwhile, ContentResolver provides some universal methods (query, insert, delete, and update) to manage these data. Therefore, we apply our modification to these methods in ContentResolver for our purpose. Instead of returning the expected data, an empty dataset will be returned if a corresponding policy is configured beforehand.
3) MANAGING PERIPHERAL STATE
Smartphones have lots of sensors and modules to provide more powerful capabilities. Taking Developer Options mentioned before as an example, it enables application developers to access most of the resources on their devices easily, but also can be misused by malicious applications to break their privacy. Users can configure a policy to indicate that the change state operation can be granted only in a specific context. In fact, once the Developer option is closed, all the states of the list of options will be closed.
After analyzing the source code of the Setting application, we find that the seven times tapping will trigger a method named setEnable in DeviceInfoSetting to open the Developer Options. Thus we modified this method, and whenever the user or an application (probably malicious app) tries to open the Developer Options, our usage control system first checks the validity according to policies configured by users and denies the unauthorized request.
4) RESTRICTIONS ON APP INSTALLATION
In order to prevent potentially malicious applications to install malware secretly in the background, we must figure out all the channels for application installation. There are four ways in total to install apps: downloading apps through the internet and installing them; installing apps stored in SD card; using PM command provided by Android to install apps; utilizing ADB commands to install apps.
After analyzing the source code of the Android OS, we find that a specific method in PackageManageService will be used to verify the signatures of apps by all these four ways, and the process of installing an app will be failed if the app does not pass the verification. Thus we modified this method to prevent applications from installing apps secretly in the background. Whenever an application tries to install applications, our usage control system checks the validity according to policies configured by users and would stop the installing process if it is unauthorized.
5) CONTROLLING POWER ENERGY
In order to let users execute some important background tasks, Android provides a WakeLock mechanism that can be used to hold a CPU lock to prevent the CPU from suspending, which will cause power energy being wasted. Developers request the CPU lock utilizing the acquire method in PowerManager of Android, so we customize the acquire method to prevent unnecessary requests of WakeLock. For example, if users configure policies to save power energy when they are falling asleep, EasyPrivacy will prevent any WakeLock requests of apps.
B. POLICY CONFLICT
To address the policy conflict, we adopt four types of rules to let users choose when they are configuring policies in our EasyPrivacy system.
• Deny-overrides: If any restriction is ''Deny'' of multiple available policies, the result is ''Deny''.
• Grant-overrides: If any restriction is ''Grant'' of multiple available policies, the result is ''Grant''.
• Majority-overrides: The result depends on which restriction gets more than half of the votes.
• User-overrides: List all the available policies and remind users to make the final decision.
Assuming two policies p i and p j have the following form as defined in Section III: p i/j = (r i/j , c i/j ), where r i/j = (s i/j , o i/j , a i/j ) and c i/j = (l i/j , st i/j , et i/j ). The relationship between p i and p j can be divided into three categories as shown in Table 2 . Taking the last case as an example, if the location of contexts c i and c j overlaps each other (l i = l j ) as well as their time periods (st i ≤ st j ≤ et i ), policy p i and p j can be enforced simultaneously. Meanwhile, if p i and p j have the opposite actions (a i = a j ) on the same subject and object (s i = s j o i = o j ), then policy conflict occurs between p i and p j . Once multiple policies are available in a specific context, our model will choose an authorized decision based on the pre-configured rules, and determine which action (deny or grant) should be enforced. Taking the Denyoverridesrule as an example, the policy that has a deny action should be the final decision when employing this rule.
C. IMPLEMENTATION OF TIPSTOOL
We developed TipsTool to facilitate users that have little domain knowledge configuring their policies reasonably utilizing Android app development technology as shown in Fig.4 . As the TipsTool mainly consists of Context Manager, Restriction Manager, and MDE, we introduce the implementation of them separately.
Context Manager is developed mainly utilizing the LocationService to get the location coordinates and the Calendar object provided by Android to get the actual time.
The core function of Restriction Manager is the potential Malware Detection Engine (MDE) mentioned before, so we mainly focus on the implementation of MDE. We describe the implementation of MDE according to the two working phase of MDE mentioned in Section III, as shown in Fig. 3. 
1) OFFLINE TRAINING PHASE
In order to get a lightweight malware detection service, we put the model training in an offline environment, and the steps are shown below:
• Data collecting: We collected applications from multiple sources: (i) PlayDrone [49] , a scalable Google Play Store crawler that scans and downloads applications from the app store. The whole set of applications crawled from the Google Play Store has been shared using PlayDrone online. 2 (ii) AndroTotal, 3 a publicly available tool for detecting malware. It exposes a free-of-charge API to let researchers gain access to all the uploaded samples. (iii) DREBIN [40] , the largest third-party malware dataset with labelled families.
• Data processing: As the collected dataset is impure, we utilized VirusTotal, 4 a free online service that analyzes suspicious files to detect types of malware using 52 anti-virus engines. If more than 10 anti-virus engines recognize an application as malware, then we treated it as malware to get a high quality ground truth. Otherwise this application was considered as benign. In total we collected 203,650 Android application package (apk) files consisting of 182,341 benign apps and 21,309 malware as the dataset.
• Feature extracting: More than 18,000 features were extracted from apk files of the dataset with the help of Androguard, 5 a tool for reverse engineering of Android written in python. Besides the conventional static features (permission, system API, and signature), we extended the features to n-opcodes, and we choose 3-opcodes according to B Kang's work 36].
• Parameters choosing: The selection of parameters in machine learning classifiers determines the accuracy and stability of the training results. We adopted 5-fold cross validation based on grid search to choose the best parameters of classifiers used in our system, which are k-NearestNeighbor (KNN), AdaBoost (Ada), Random Forest (RF), Gradient Boosting Machine (GBM), and Support Vector Machine (SVM). The result is presented in Table 4 in Section V.
• Model training: Last, we trained the dataset with these five classifiers (KNN, Ada, RF, GBM, and SVM) and the ensemble of them to get a high accuracy of malware detection. The accuracy of our method and a comparison with related approaches are presented in Table 5 in Section V.
2) ONLINE WORKING PHASE
We integrate the model that trained in the previous phase with TipsTool. Once users configure the restrictions of policies, this model can be used to detect and list potentially malicious apps for users to facilitate their policy configurations.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
This section describes the experimental results on our context-aware resource usage control system and TipsTool, and explains the impact on the performance of the smartphones. In order to get a reliable result, we test this system in a real environment that porting our customized Android OS and installing TipsTool to a Galaxy S4 smartphone.
In the first experiment, we applied our modifications to the Android Nougat to implement our resource usage control system. 6 Then we evaluated the functionality of our system by porting the modified Android OS to a Galaxy S4 smartphone. 7 With the increasing computing capability of smartphones and the lightweight of our resource usage control system, battery consumption becomes a significant factor to evaluate our system. Therefore, we evaluate the battery consumptions with three contrast tests: battery consumption under the original Android OS; battery consumption under our customized Android OS; battery consumption under our customized Android OS with the policy for saving power energy, and we set our usage control system to check the device location updates every 60 seconds. To ensure that all three tests were under the same environment, we forced the system apps that pre-installed with the Android OS (Browser, Calculator, Email, Contact, etc.) and some third-party apps (WeChat, Alipay, taobao, QQ, etc.) that request for WakeLock frequently to run in the background. Meanwhile, we forced the Galaxy S4 to stay on with Wi-Fi and GPS enabled. Fig. 5 shows that the battery percentage drops about 7% less per hours comparing the original Android with our modified Android. While compared to the battery consumption under original Android, the battery consumption under our customized Android with saving power policy saves about 10% per hour. In our observation, WeChat, taobao, and 6 https://wiki.lineageos.org/devices/jfltexx/build. 7 https://wiki.lineageos.org/devices/jfltexx/install. QQ were trying to acquire the WakeLock secretly once they released it during the entire time, wasting significant battery energy [48] . The reason for saving power about 10% is that our saving power energy policy can deny these requests to acquire WakeLock.
In order to implement our energy-based and privacy-based policies, we applied our modifications on the corresponding methods on the Android OS to enable Android to control the usage of these resources. Next, we evaluated the timing overhead introduced by our modifications to the Android OS to implement the resource usage control system. We calculated the time it takes before and after our modifications on Android to estimate the overhead. Specifically, we measured the overhead time caused by controlling the usage request to permissions, data, system peripheral, app installation and power energy. As the results shown in Table 3 , the overall delay incurred by our modifications is not perceivable by the user.
We designed and implemented TipsTool to facilitate users to identify what applications should be restricted in resource usage, thus a higher detection accuracy of suspicious apps can help users configure their policies more reasonably. The purpose of the following experiments is to evaluate the accuracy of MDE in TipsTool can achieve, we mainly focused on choosing the best parameters of machine learning classifiers that we used (KNN, Ada, RF, GBM, and SVM), and training our datasets to achieve a high accuracy in malware detection.
First, we used KNN, Ada, RF, and SVM classifiers provided by scikit-learn library of python [37] and a GBM classifier named LightGBMClassifier provided by LightGBM framework [38] . Then we adopted 5-fold cross validation to choose the best significant parameters of our classifiers and kept the value of other parameters as default. The result is shown in Table 4 . Next, we split the dataset into two subsets for training (70%) and testing (30%) randomly. Then, we trained these samples under those five classifiers mentioned before, and the result is depicted in Fig. 6 . We can see that each of these five classifiers achieves a high accuracy and stability in malware detection. Last, we employed the ensemble of these five classifiers with majority-voting and malware-overrides (if the detection result of any classifier is malware, then returning malware as the final decision. Otherwise the final result is benign) rules. In contrast, we considered the following two methods as baselines: (i) the first work that using machine learning based methods to detect malware with comprehensive static features [40] ; (ii) a highly cited Android malware detection method [39] . The result is shown in Table 5 . We can easily find that the ensemble of basic classifiers gains significant performance (97.4% under Majority Voting rule and 98.4% under Malware Override rule) with a lower false positive rate (FPR), and outperforms other benchmarks, even roughly 10% higher than [39] . Thus our work can provide a precise list of potentially malicious apps to facilitate users to configure their policies more reasonably.
VI. FUNCTIONALITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we discuss the challenges when enabling users to control the resources usage on their smartphones according to different specific context. Meanwhile, we analyze these challenges and present the corresponding countermeasures based on the functionality of our context-aware usage control system. Last, we discuss the challenges when porting our system to a new version of the Android OS.
As well as most previous work [19] , our resource usage control system can also prevent multiple types of attacking, such as colluding applications by configuring policies based on the unique PackageName and UID of the application. However, most of the previous work ignores some significant issues, such as incomplete coverage of resource usage control and unreasonable policy configurations.
A. INCOMPLETE COVERAGE OF RESOURCES USAGE CONTROL
Current context-aware resource usage control systems can protect lots of resources on smartphones, except power energy and app installation, which will be used to cause heavy energy or privacy issues. For instance, the adware may download advertises secretly even when users are falling asleep, which will cause unnecessary drain on the device battery. For this reason, our implementation extends the protected resource to power energy, and users can configure policies to prevent unnecessary battery usage. Potentially malicious apps can easily bypass current resource usage control systems by installing and uninstalling malware dynamically. For example, in order to prevent a sensitive conversation from being exposed, the user configures a rigorous policy to restrict applications installed on the smartphone from accessing the microphone resource with the record permission, but one potentially malicious application may install malware (downloaded early and stored in SD card) secretly without any prompts to record the sensitive conversation when the conversation is taking, and uninstall this malware when the conversation is finished. In case of that, we also extend the protected resources to app installation to let users control any app installing activities.
B. POLICY CONFLICT
It is obvious that there may exist policy conflict when multiple policies alternatives in a certain context and these policies may be mutually exclusive or inclusive, which may disable privacy-based policies and cause privacy leakage. Our implementation solves this kind of issue by introducing a module named Policy-Conflict Arbitrator based on PolicyCombining-Rules.
C. UNREASONABLE POLICY CONFIGURATIONS
All the previous approaches design and implement their systems based on a hypothesis that users have enough domain knowledge on security or privacy protection to configure appropriate policies. However, they ignore a premise that the domain knowledge is actually what users lake of, they can not figure out which application will take what potential hazard in a specific context, so it is difficult for users to configure policies reasonably without any specialist help. To address it, we design and implement an application to facilitate users to configure their policies through helping users obtain context information and identifying the suspicious applications.
D. LIMITATION
This paper first considers the policy conflict problem and provides a simply solution to facilitate the non-specialist users to configure policies, avoiding the unnecessary conflicts. However, the proposed solution is currently applicable to simple cases. In reality, the policy conflict is a very complex issue, and we leave the improvements to the future.
In order to implement our system on a new version of the Android OS, there are mainly two challenges:
• Locating the relevant source code (time-consuming but simple): Taking Android 4.0 and 5.0 as an example, the dictionary structure of the source code (e.g. the implementation of system services) has changed greatly, as well as the code style. Thus, it may need more time to locate the desired code snippet.
• Introducing new mechanisms (infrequent but complex): Taking the latest version of the Android OS (Android P) 8 as an example, it limits the ability for background apps to access user input and sensor data. Apps are also denied to access the microphone and camera if they are running in the background. Under this premise, there may cause a conflict if a permission-based policy grants a request to access the microphone or camera when the app is running in the background. Thus an extra modification 8 https://developer.android.com/preview/behavior-changes.
(checking if the app is running in the background before granting the request) of the policy mechanisms needs to be applied.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we present a context-aware resource usage control system to provide adaptive usage control automatically when the specific context is detected according to the pre-configured policies. We first consider and provide a solution to simply address the policy conflict problem, which is ignored by previous work. In addition, we design and implement an application named TipsTool, users with little domain knowledge can easily configure policies to protect their privacy, security and save energy of smartphones.
In future work, we will further improve our preliminary policy conflict solution. Besides, we will extend our work to provide more individual and intelligent resource usage control utilizing multiple sensors embedded on smartphones. 
